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DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: WILL THE POLITICAL,
CULTURAL AND LEGAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO INHIBIT THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF FAIR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES?
ABSTRACT
The impending North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will bring
order to the growing interdependence in trade relations between Mexico and the
United States. However, before Mexico will ratify NAFTA important political,
cultural and legal differences affecting the trade relations between the respective
nations must be addressed, resolved and reflected in the resultant Agreement. This
Comment examines one of the issues of the impending NAFTA that will be
affected by these legal differences: the establishment of fair dispute settlement
procedures. It is suggested that the establishment of these procedures can be
achieved by using the dispute settlement procedures from the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement as a model. However, these existing procedures must be
reviewed and tailored for use in NAFTA in order to address and mitigate the
political, cultural and legal differences affecting the trade relations between Mexico
and the United States. This Comment concludes that the existing dispute resolution
procedures from the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement can be successfully
adapted for use in NAFTA and makes recommendations for tailoring these existing
procedures to respond to the political, cultural and legal differences affecting the
trade relations between Mexico and the United States.
INTRODUCTION
Trade between different areas of the world has occurred throughout
history to the mutual advantage of the participants. In an effort to encourage
such trade, nations have entered into international agreements that established
the ground rules and parameters under which the various aspects of trad&
between the individual nations were to be conducted. Recently, however,
due to an increase in world regionalism and the convergence of economic
sources and resources, multinational trading blocs have been established
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throughout the world.1 Under the auspices of these trade blocs, the member
nations have established the ground rules and parameters for trade between
each other in which tariffs are removed or reduced on products of members
but remain unchanged on products traded with non-member nations.2
Currently, the most prominent and formidable of these trading blocs is the
European Community (EC). 3
Partly because of the economic success of the EC, the United States and
Canada have formulated their own trading bloc under the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement.' Further, using the Canada-U.S. agreement as a starting
point, the United States, Canada and Mexico are currently negotiating the
establishment of a three-nation (trilateral) agreement-the much-vaunted
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 5 However, before
Mexico can or would be willing to ratify NAFTA, important political,
cultural and legal differences affecting the respective nations must be
addressed, resolved and reflected in any resultant Free Trade Agreement.6
This Comment examines one of the issues of the impending NAFTA that
will be affected by these political, cultural and legal differences: dispute
settlement procedures. While dispute settlement procedures exist in the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,7 these procedures can be used and
adapted for application to the NAFTA. Therefore, it is indispensable to
understand the political, cultural and legal differences that affect the trade
relations between Mexico and the United States8 in order to review and
1. Tape of seminar by B. Timothy Bennett, former Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representa-
tive for Mexico and currently Vice President, SJS Strategies, held by Center for U.S-Mexico
Studies, University of California, San Diego (Jan. 20, 1991) (on file with the Center).
2. The Case for Opening World Markets, Bus. AM., Mar. 11, 1991, at 7.
3. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 411 (1958).
4. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter Canada-U.S. FTA] (1988).
5. Gist: North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, March 25,
1991, at 214. On February 5, 1991, President Bush announced that the governments of the
United States, Canada, and Mexico are preparing to negotiate a historic free trade and
investment agreement. Id.
6. Sidney Weintraub, The Impact of the Agreement on Mexico, in MAKING FREE TRADE
WORK: THE CANADA-U.S. AGREEMENT 102, 116-20 (Peter Morici ed., 1990).
7. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4.
8. The difference between the trade policies of Mexico and the United States is based on their
disparate degrees of political, economic, cultural and legal development within the international
trading community. These differences have made tensions in trade relations between the two
countries inevitable. SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE: RELATIONS
BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES 69-72 (1990).
Such tensions often result in trade disputes between Mexico and the United States. For
example, trade dispute arose between the two countries over the treatment of U.S.
pharmaceutical companies operating in Mexico. In 1975, Mexico revised its Law on Inventions
and Trademarks to remove patent protection in Mexico for products and processes for U.S.
pharmaceuticals, jeopardizing this industry's property rights. Initially, the U.S. pharmaceutical
mdustry exerted substantial pressure on Mexico to have the revised laws repealed. Officials in
Mexico, resenting this pressure, reacted negatively and reiterated their resolve to retain the new
law. Next, the U.S. government, because of pressure from the U.S. pharmaceutical industry,
retaliated against Mexico by reducing some of the trading preferences extended to Mexico. This
made Mexican officials even firmer in their resolve to not reinstate patent protection. The trade
2
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tailor the existing dispute settlement procedures for incorporation into the
NAFTA.
This Comment begins with a presentation of the circumstances that have
led to the creation of the NAFTA. Section I first describes the economic and
political theories supporting the creation of free trade areas and agreements
in order to optimize international trade. It then describes change and growth
in the trade relations between Mexico and the United States that have led to
formulation of the NAFTA.
Section II provides an overview of the Canada-U.S. FTA. It specifically
details the parameters of the existing dispute resolution procedures in this
Agreement. This section also discusses the jurisprudence which is beginning
to emerge from the use of these procedures between Canada and the United
States.
The next section, Section III, explores the political, cultural and legal
differences between the United States and Mexico that will shape the use of
the Canada-U.S. FTA dispute resolution procedures in the NAFTA. While
there are recognized political, cultural and legal differences between Canada
and Mexico, these differences are not nearly as great as those between the
United States and Mexico. Therefore, a detailed discussion of the Canada-
Mexico differences is beyond the scope of this comment.
Finally, Section IV makes recommendations for tailoring these existing
dispute resolution procedures for inclusion in the NAFTA. The Comment
concludes that the existing Canada-U.S. dispute resolution procedures can be
successfully tailored to respond to the political, cultural and legal differences
affecting Mexico and the U.S. The inclusion of fair dispute settlement
procedures will greatly aid in achieving the ratification of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement to the mutual benefit of all parties.
I. THE CREATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Free Trade Areas and Agreements
Economists believe that free international trade is beneficial to a nation
because when each nation specializes in the products that it can make most
dispute escalated further when the U.S. pharmaceutical industry requested action under section
of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 which permits the president of the United States to unilaterally
impose restrictions on imports if he is under any trade agreement or if foreign practices arejudged to be unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory. Fausto C. Miranda, Issues in
Current United States-Mexico Negotiations on a Bilateral Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement, Remarks at the Conference on Current Legal Issues in U.S./Tradc and Investment(Oct. 9, 1987) (Transcript available through the American Bar Association, Section on
International Law and Practice).
This trade dispute simmered between the two countries until 1985 when the United States
was able to secure a revision to Mexico's Law on Inventions and Trademarks that protected the
patent rights of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry by coercively withholding its approval on an
agreement covering subsidies and countervailing duties practices between the two countries.
WEINTRAuB, supra, at 21 & 83.
3
Fitch: Dispute Settlement Under the North American Free Trade Agreement:
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
356 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
efficiently and trades for the other products it needs, overall welfare is
increased for all nations, consumers and businesses.9 Thus, free trade
allows each nation to reap maximum benefits from its economic potential,
and, in the end, maximum global wealth is attained as well."0 Moreover,
it is thought that a free trade area, a limited regional arrangement in which
associated nations eliminate trade barriers on each others' goods and
services, is one of the steps towards reaching this desired general global
trade liberalization."
A Free Trade Area is defined in Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a group of two or more nations in which the
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on
substantially all the trade between the associated nations. 2 To establish a
free trade area, two or more nations negotiate and enter into a bilateral or
multilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in which the associated nations
agree to ultimately abolish all trade barriers, including quotas, tariffs,
subsidies and non-tariff barriers such as license fees, on goods and services
traded between them. 3 Such an agreement is considered to be a catalyst
9. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 17 (2d ed. 1986).
Under the law of comparative advantage, an economic theory developed by David Ricardo
to explain what goods would be traded between two countries, a nation exports the good it
produces more efficiently than another nation and imports the good that it produces less effi-
ciently. As a result, both nations only produce those goods in which they have the greater
advantage and, thus, both gain from this specialization and exchange. Id. at 12-13.
However, the application of tariffs and other trade barriers conflict with the principles of
the law of comparative advantage. On no other subject are economists-notorious for their
failure to agree about anything-so close to unanimity. Tariffs and other trade barriers raise
prices in the domestic market, imposing a burden on consumers and allowing firms to continue
production in areas in which they are inefficient. Jobs are temporarily preserved, but at a cost
that increases unemployment later. Why Trade Barriers Will Fall, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 30,
1988, at 65.
10. Winfried Ruigrok, Paradigm Crisis in International Trade Theory, 25 J. WORLD TRADE
77, 77-78 (1991).
11. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 9, at 454-55. In order for a free trade area to aid in trade
liberalization, trade barriers must not be increased for those nations outside the regional free
trade area.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 268 (1950)
[hereinafter GAT]. Under Article XXIV of GAIT, a free trade area has been traditionally
recognized as an exception to the requirements of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle,
exempting the members of a free trade agreement from having to grant the same advantages,
favors, privileges or immunities ratified under the free trade agreement equally to the other
GAIT members as required by Article I.
13. Ronald C. Griffin, The Free Trade Agreement: It Muddles the Law, 28 WASHBURN L.J.
205, 213 (1988).
The trade policy of the United States since World War II has been primarily to reduce
trade barriers. Its objective has not been absolute free trade, but freer trade. WEINTRAUB,
supra note 8, at 69-70.
In contrast, Mexico has traditionally pursued its industrialization objectives through the
employment of import substitution trade policy. Under this policy, the Mexican government
erected and enforced both trade and non-tariff barriers in order to encourage the domestic
production of manufactured goods and to restrict the importation of such goods-goods that
otherwise could have been imported from the United States. These barriers included high
tariffs, quotas, large domestic subsidies, import licensing requirements and official import
4
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for economic growth and development in the associated countries,14
stimulating competition and driving inefficient businesses from the market
place. 15
Within the past seven years, the United States has entered into FTAs
with two countries. In 1985, the United States entered into a free trade
agreement with Israel. 6 In 1988, President Reagan of the United States
and Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada signed the Canada-United States
reference prices (duties).
However, in the 1980s, Mexican began a trade liberalization program and, during this same
time period, Mexico acceded to GATT. Both the trade liberalization program and accession to
GAIT have caused Mexico to greatly reduce or eliminate many of its trade and non-tariff
barriers on imported goods. Nevertheless, a variety of trade and non-tariff barriers are still
being imposed by Mexico on exports from the United States, particularly those exports from the
agricultural, petrochemical, electronics, automotive, apparel, and pharmaceutical sectors. United
States International Trade Commission Publication 2275, Review of Trade and Investment
Liberalization Measures By Mexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican Relations,
Apr. 1990, at 1-1 and 4-1-4-12.
However, during the 1980s, the direction of each country's trade policies began to change,
with the United States retreating towards greater protectionism and Mexico becoming increasing-
ly more open. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 69.
14. Gist: U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Dec. 31, 1990,
at 363. The benefits that result from the free trade within the associated countries enhance
productivity and wealth sufficiently to cause even more trade with nonmembers. This increased
trade with nonmembers further contributes to the economic growth and development of the
associated countries. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 9, at 17 & 455.
15. Griffin, supra note 13, at 213. Free trade among the associated countries promotes a
mutually profitable division of labor, greatly enhances the potential real national product of each
of the members and makes possible higher standards of living because it encourages people to
think about business ventures in terms of comparative advantage (specialization), competitive
advantage, and profits. Id. and see JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 9.
16. Israel-United States: Free Trade Area Agreement, signed April 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653
(1985).
The Israel-U.S. Free Trade Area Agreement (FTAA) was negotiated in response to the
political and economic concerns of both Israel and the United States. Israel, aware of internal
political pressure by hostile groups on the U.S Government to limit (or cut off) outright foreign
aid, approached the U.S. regarding a more favorable trade relationship-the FTAA. Israel had
three (3) goals for the creation of a FTAA. Israel was anxious preserve its preferential access
to U.S markets for its imports and exports, it needed to counteract the effects of the boycott
imposed against it by the Arab States of the Middle East and North Africa and it had to offset
the scarcity of saleable natural resources.
On the other hand, the United States' prime motivation for entering into the FTAA was
economic-it was eager to wean an ally from aid to trade and to regain some of its international
market share lost to the EEC-as part of its overall policy of liberalizing trade.
The FTAA provides for the staged reduction of duties on imports into the respective
Parties' territories, over a ten-year period, so that by January 1, 1995, all trade will be duty
free. The agreement will also cover non-tariff barriers.
Overall, the principle U.S. and Israeli objectives under the FTAA have been met. Trade
between the two countries has increased and will probably continue to do so. Further, the U.S.
has used the FTAA to show its other trading partners that intends to achieve greater international
market share through the establishment of trading relationships for mutual benefit. See Nicholas
A. Aminoff, The United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement of 1985: In Theory and
Practice, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1991).
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Free Trade Agreement which entered into force on January 1, 1989.17
Most recently, in February 1990, President Bush, Canadian Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, and Mexican President Salinas de Gortari announced plans
to commence negotiations in 1991 for the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment."8
B. Formulation of the NAFTA
For most of the twentieth century United States foreign policy has
17. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, at 281.
January 1, 1989 was the beginning the ten-year phased implementation period of the
Canada-U.S. FTA which will ultimately result in the elimination of all tariffs and many non-
tariff measures that affect trade between the two countries on tangible goods, services and direct
foreign investment. Rachel McCulloch, The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 37
INT'L TRADE: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 79, 79-80 (1990).
In the United States, the FTA easily received congressional approval from a mostly
uninterested United States Congress. The focus of the United States regarding the PTA was on
its economic advantages, including: general trade liberalization benefits, greater access to the
Canadian market for U.S. goods, and the enhance competition with the EC. Oversight of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 100th Cong. 2d. Sess. 83, 85-93 (Mar. 16, 1988) (statement of Ambassador Clayton
Yeutter, United States Trade Representative).
In contrast, the required parliamentary approval in Canada was received only after a period
of unprecedented national debate and disunity (The Great Trade Debate), resulting in a bitter
federal election. The Canadian opposition to the PTA primarily centered around, not the
economic issues surrounding of tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions on Canadian goods and
services, but rather the emotional fear of losing the "Canadian way of life"-the political,
cultural and legal implications of the treaty. Maureen A. Farrow & Robert C. York, Economic,
Social, and Cultural Policy Independence in the Post-free Trade Era: A View From Canada,
in THE CANADA-U. S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 117 (Daniel E. Nolle ed., 1990). Nevertheless,
Prime Minister Mulroney's Progressive Conservatives Party was reelected by a majority and the
PTA was approved by the Canadian Parliament on Dec. 30 1988, just 2 days before the FTA
entered into force on Jan. 1, 1989. Rebecca A. Sanford, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Its Aspects, Highlights, and Probable Impact on Future Bilateral Trade and Trading
Agreements, 7 DICK. J. INT'L L. 371, 381-82 (1989).
Since the PTA has only been in effect for a little over two (2) years, it may be a little too
early to tell whether it is completely living up or down to the expectations of both countries.
On one hand, some experts have estimated that Canada has lost 300,000 manufacturing jobs
(13% of its total), primarily to lower-wage plants in the United States. Harry Bernstein,
Opposition to Free-Trade Pact Grows, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at D3. On the other hand,
other experts have cited examples of accelerated tariff reductions, significant increases in exports
from Canada into the United States and increased business development along both sides of the
Canadian-U.S. border as indicating the success of the Canada-U.S. FTA. Paul Bucher, U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement Encourages Bilateral Business, BUS. AM., Apr. 8, 1991, at 14-
15.
18. Gist: North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 5.
The Bush administration has received an extension of the so-called "fast-track" authority
authorized under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2902,
2903). Karen Tumulty, Senate Clears Way for Talks with Mexico on Trade Pact, L.A. TIMES,
May 25, 1991, at D-1.
Under the fast-track procedure, the President can proceed to negotiate the agreement and
present it to Congress for approval. Congress then has 90 legislative days either to accept or
to reject it (on a straight yes-or-no vote), but not to amend specific provisions of the negotiated
package. Id.
Negotiations of the NAFTA commenced June 12, 1991. Stuart Auerbach, U.S., Canada,
Mexico Begin Free-Trade Talks: Disparities Expected to Complicate Efforts, WASH. POST, June
13, 1991, at A40.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2 [1992], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol22/iss2/5
1992] DISPUTE SETTlEMENT UNDER THE N. AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 359
focused on distant more than neighboring countries." As a consequence,
United States trade policy, particularly since World War II, has been based
primarily on relations with the European Community and Japan.2 But in
recent years national attention has started to shift toward the south. 21 One
result of this shift is that Mexico has become the third ranking U.S. trading
partner after Canada and Japan.' Further, the United States accounts for
70 percent of Mexico's annual $50-billion trade.' According to the U.S.
International Trade Commission, "This interdependence means that neither
country can avoid being affected by the other's economic, social and political
climate."' Until recently, neither Mexico nor the U.S. would publicly
recognize the economic and political consequences of their growing interde-
pendence.' However, the agreement between U.S President Bush and
Mexico's President Salinas de Gortari to work toward an agreement on free
trade indicates that the two countries are finally willing to publicly recognize
their mutual interdependence.' "A free trade agreement would bring order
19. Brce K. Maclaury, Foreword to SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, FREE TRADE WITH MEXICO AND
THE UNITED STATES? vii (1984).
20. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 9, at 198.
21. Brce K. Maclaury, supra note 19, at vii.
22. Victor B. Bailey & Joanne Tucker, U. S. Foreign Trade Highlights 1989, U. S. Dept. of
Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, at 48
(Sept. 1990).
23. Richard Johns & Robert Graham, Drawing Closer to Mexico, WORLD PRESS REV., Aug.
1990, at 58.
24. United States International Trade Commission Publication 2326, Review of Trade and
Investment Liberalization Measures By Mexico and Prospects for Future United States-Mexican
Relations, Oct. 1990, at ix [hereinafter USITC].
25. Id.
26. Fact Sheet: U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations, U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Nov. 26,
1990, at 293. "President Bush notified Congress on Sept. 25, 1990 that he and Mexican
President Salinas intended to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) which would eliminate the
restrictions on the flow of goods, services and investments between the United States and
Mexico." Id.
United States proponents of a free trade agreement that includes Mexico believe that such
an agreement will be advantageous to the United States. These advantages are summarized
below:
1) Enhancement of U.S. international competitive advantage, especially with the increase in
world regionalism and emerging trading blocs;
2) Provide greater U.S. access to a growing Mexican consumer market;
3) Creation of jobs in the United States;
4) Aid in the further development of the U.S. border areas;
5) Provide greater stability and predictability for U.S. investors in Mexico; and
6) Decrease the number of illegal immigrants coming into the United States.
USITC Publication 2326, supra note 24, at 1-12-16.
Mexican proponents of such an agreement also believe that a free trade agreement with the
United States would be advantageous to Mexico, as follows:
1) Provide a guaranteed access for its exports to the U.S. market;
2) Return flight capital;
3) Attract foreign investment;
4) Increase Mexican productivity and international competitiveness; and
5) Increase employment.
USITC Publication 2326, supra note 24, at 1-12-16.
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to the two countries' interdependence."27
While negotiations as to the scope of the pending NAFTA has not yet
been concluded,' the provisions of the Canada-U.S. FTA will be used as
the model.' Just as in the Canada-U.S. FTA, NAFTA will encompass the
gradual and comprehensive elimination of trade barriers between the three
countries, including:
1. phased-in elimination of all import tariffs,
2. elimination of, or greatest possible reduction, on non-tariff barriers, such
as import quotas, licenses, and technical barriers to trade,
3. establishment of clear and binding protection for intellectual property
rights,
4. means to improve and expand the flow of goods, services and investment
between the United States, Canada and Mexico, and
5. fair and expeditious dispute settlement procedures."
Mexico has two main objectives in the negotiations: (1) eliminating
present barriers to trade and (2) preventing the creation of future ones. 1
27. Carlos Ramirez, MEXICO: President Salinas Wants A Free-trade Agreement With the
United States Because the Success of His Controversial Economic Policy Depends On It. But
Washington Has Doubts, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1990, at M-5.
28. It is anticipated that negotiations of the NAFTA will conclude sometime during the
summer of 1992. Guy Gugliotta, Talks on North American Free Trade Pact Advance:
Prospects of Heated Battle with Congress During Election Year May Lead to Delay, WASH.
POST, Jan. 16, 1992, at A28.
Negotiations on a North American Free Trade Agreement are moving ahead without
major complications, but a quick conclusion to the pact could depend on President
Bush's willingness to undertake a potentially ugly new trade battle with Congress
during an election year.
Bush, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Canadian Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney are on record favoring a prompt and successful conclusion to the
negotiations, and U.S. trade officials said the agreement could arrive in Congress as
early as July [1992].
Id.
29. USITC Publication 2326, supra note 24, at 1-9.
30. USITC Publication 2353, The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade
Agreement With Mexico, Feb. 1991, at xix-xx.
Although Mexico has significantly reduced its trade barriers, some barriers remain. Import
licensing requirements still affect about 6% of the value of U.S. exports to Mexico. Further,
40% of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico require import licenses. Imports into Mexico are
also affected by discriminatory government procurement policies, standards, testing, and
certification requirements, limited intellectual property protection, and exclusive sales rights and
distribution contracts. There and other limitations are exacerbated by the lack of transparency
of the procedures through which exporters into Mexico can apply for the proper license,
certificate or test. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1991 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, at 155-63.
31. Herminlo Blanco, Chief Negotiator for the Free Trade Agreement, Mexico, Setting the
Agenda for Free Trade Negotiations in North America, Address at a Joint Conference sponsored
by the Overseas Development Council and the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (Oct. 25, 1990).
With a secure market access for its exports through an FTA coupled with sound internal
economic development, Mexico seeks to foster growth and employment, and to attract both
8
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Herminio Blanco, Chief NAFTA Negotiator for Mexico, has stated that the
objective to prevent the erection of future barriers can be achieved, in part,
through the establishment of dispute settlement procedures that are fair and
judicious, such as the ones in the Canada-U.S. FTA. 2
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES UNDER
THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Overview of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
The objectives of the Canada-U.S. FTA are to:
1. eliminate barriers to trade in goods and services between the territories
of the Parties;
2. facilitate conditions of fair competition within the free trade area;
3. liberalize significantly conditions for investment within this free trade
area;
4. establish effective procedures for the joint administration of this Agree-
ment and the resolution of disputes; and
5. lay the foundation for further bilateral and multilateral cooperation to
expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.3
One of the most contentious aspects of the Canada-U.S. FTA negotia-
tions involved the dispute settlement procedures.' "The maintenance of a
harmonious relationship between nations bound by an international agreement
requires procedures to avoid conflicts and, should they arise, to resolve them
quickly and effectively to the satisfaction of the Parties involved." 35 The
lack of an efficient and effective method of enforcing the rights and obliga-
tions established under the Canada-U.S. FTA would have raised serious
doubts as to FTA's viability as a whole.'
The Parties needed to develop dispute settlement procedures that would
effectively address and mitigate the political, cultural, and legal differences
affecting the two Parties in their trade relations under the FTA . 7 Speci-
fically, the political differences the Parties had to address were:
foreign private investment and the return of flight capital. Id.
32. id.
33. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 102, at 293.
34. Keith B. Ferguson, Dispute Setlement Under the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 47 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 317, 318 (1989).
35. J.G. Castel, The Settlement of Disputes Under the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 83 A.J.I.L. 118 (1989).
36. Ferguson, supra note 34, at 318-19.
37. Peter Morici, The Environment for Free Trade, in MAKING FREE TRADE WORK: THE
CANADA-U.S. AGREEMENT 1, 14-6 (Peter Morici ed., 1990).
9
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1. preservation of each Party's national sovereignty, 8
2. elimination of (or, at least a reduction in) the bias against Canada in the
administration of U.S. trade law,
3. foreclosure of the protectionist amendment of domestic trade legisla-
tion,' and
4. elimination of political interference in the dispute resolution process. 1
The cultural differences that had to be addressed were potential loss of
Canada's cultural identity,' 2 and preservation of each Party's cultural
policies.'
The Parties also needed to address the legal issues involved in dispute
resolution, including consistent and predictable application of domestic trade
law remedies," procedural neutrality, efficacy and efficiency, 5 and
enforcement of the FTA."
The Canada-U.S. FTA broke new ground in devising dispute settlement
procedures' because the procedures do address and reasonably mitigate the
political, cultural and legal differences, as listed above, which affect the trade
relations between Canada and the United States. Central to the FTA's
achievement in this area is that, for the first time, an international agreement
recognizes and enables the nations named in a trade dispute to actually
participate in the dispute resolution process-a binational dispute settlement
mechanism."
The specific ways in which these dispute resolution procedures address
the political, cultural and legal differences are closely interconnected and
overlap to some extent-so that one procedure often addresses and mitigates
more than one of the factors. For example, the national sovereignty and
38. Maureen A. Farrow & Robert C. York, Economic, Social, and Cultural Policy Indepen-
dence in the Post-free Trade Era: A View From Canada, in THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 121-25 (Daniel E. Nolle ed., 1990).
39. RICHARD G. LIPSEY & ROBERT C. YORK, EVALUATING THE FREE TRADE DEAL: A
GUIDED TOUR THROUGH THE CANADA-U.S. AGREEMENT 102 (1988).
40. See Ferguson, supra note 34, at 327 and 333; Ince & Sherman, infra note 47, at 137.
41. Ferguson, supra note 34, at 331.
42. See Peter Brimdlow, The Free Trade Agreement: hnplications For Canadian Identity?,
in THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 105-15 (Daniel E. Nolle ed., 1990) and Farrow
& York, supra note 38, at 127-30.
43. Farrow & York, supra note 38, at 125-27.
44. See A.M. Apuzzo & W.A. Kerr, International Arbitration-The Dispute Settlement
Procedures Chosen for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 7, 9 (1989);
LIPSEY & YORK, supra note 39.
45. Apuzzo & Kerr, supra note 44, at 8.
46. Id. at 7.
47. William K. Ince & Michele C. Sherman, Binational Panel Reviews Under Article 19 of
the U.S. -Canada Free Trade Agreement: A Novel Approach to International Dispute Resolution,
37 FED. B. NEws & J. 136 (Mar./Apr. 1990).
48. Andrew Anderson & Alan Rugman, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Legal
and Economic Analysis of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 6 J. INT'L ARB. 65, 67 (1989).
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cultural identity and policies of the Parties are maintained and preserved
through the establishment of the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission, a bination-
al political apparatus. The Commission is charged with the responsibility for
the FTA's overall management, the resolution of disputes, and to generally
act as a guardian of each Party's national political and cultural interests under
the FTA.4 Through the Commission, the Parties are provided with a
forum in which potential disputes can be preempted.' However, if a
dispute does arise, the Commission can refer it to a binational dispute settle-
ment panel of experts or binding arbitration panel."1 By settling disputes
in these binational panels, both Parties retain the ability to assert their
national sovereignty and cultural identity and policies under the FTA.
In addition, the FTA helps to foreclose the protectionist amendment of
domestic trade legislation by providing that existing Canadian and U.S. trade
laws will be applied to the other. The FTA also stipulates that any changes
to these existing laws will not apply to the other Party unless the amending
legislation explicitly so states and there has been prior notification and
consultation. 2 This precludes either Party from amending their trade laws
for protectionist purposes.
Disputes regarding the application, amendment and administration of
domestic trade laws by either Party are subject to review by binational
arbitration panels, replacing domestic judicial review and appeal proce-
dures. 3 By settling disputes through these binational arbitration panels,
both Parties gain the ability to influence the other's trade law decisions (a
kind of legislative watchdog function'), ensuring a reduction in the biased
application of U.S. trade law against Canada and in political interference in
the dispute resolution process itself.
Moreover, use of binational panels increase the consistency and predict-
ability of the application of trade law remedies, increase the procedural
neutrality, efficiency and efficacy, and enhance the legitimacy and legality
of the dispute resolution process under the FTA.1 These advantages are
attained because the panels are binational in character, composed of trade
experts, operate on strict timetables, use domestic standards of review and
can make binding and enforceable decisions.
B. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Procedures
Under the Canada-U.S. FTA dispute settlement procedures have been
49. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 64-66, 70-71, and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
54. LIPSEY & YORK, supra note 39, at 95.
55. Anderson & Rugman, supra note 48, at 69-70.
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established for disputes involving:
1. the interpretation or application of the Agreement itself (Institutional
Provisions),' and
2. countervailing duties and antidumping."
These procedures are discussed below.
1. Institutional provisions
The Institutional Provisions, found in Chapter Eighteen of the FTA,
apply to avoidance or settlement of all disputes regarding (1) the interpreta-
tion and application of the Agreement itself, or (2) whenever a Partys
believes that an actual or proposed measure of the other Party is or would be
inconsistent with the Agreement. 9 The only disputes not settled under this
chapter are those regarding financial institutions, antidumping or counter-
vailing duty cases.' However, if a dispute arises under both the FTA and
GATT,6 the complaining Party can, at its discretion, elect to have the
dispute settled in either forum.62 Once the dispute procedure under one
forum has been chosen for a specific complaint, that forum shall be used to
the exclusion of any other.'
To begin the dispute settlement process under Chapter Eighteen, the
complaining Party must first provide written notification to the other Party
56. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, ch. 18, at 383-86.
57. Id. at 386.
58. Under section 202(f)(6) of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C.A. § 2112 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990)), the term 'Party' means Canada
or the United States. As a result, in the United States Government vernacular, the governments
of Canada and/or the United States are referred to as "the Capital P Party(s)."
In addition, under section 102(c), no person other than the United States Government has
a cause of action or defense under Chapter 18 of the Agreement. Also, a challenge to any action
or inaction by any department or agency of federal, state, or local government on the grounds
of inconsistency with the Agreement is prohibited. Thus, there are no private rights to challenge
Government action allegedly inconsistent with the Agreement. However, there are private rights
to challenge the implementation of the binational review system under Chapter Nineteen
concerning constitutional issues. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act of 1988, sec. 401(c), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(g)(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
59. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1801, at 383.
60. Id. at 383. Disputes regarding financial institutions, which is not a subject of this
comment, are settled under procedures set forth in Chapter Thirteen. See Canada-U.S. FTA,
supra note 4, art. 1704, at 382.
Disputes regarding antidumping and countervailing duty cases are settled under procedures
set forth in Chapter Nineteen. See Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904, at 387, and infra
notes 94-114 and accompanying text.
61. For a comparison of the dispute settlement procedures under the GAIT and the Canada-
U.S. FTA, see Robert P. Parker, Dispute Settlement in the GATT and the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 83 (1989).
62. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1801, at 383.
63. Id.
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of the proposed or actual measure' considered to materially affect the
operation of the Agreement.' After receipt of the notification, the Parties
may make an attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the
issue through consultations.' If consultations are unsuccessful in resolving
the dispute within thirty days, either Party can refer the dispute to the
Canada-U.S. Trade Commission.67
The Canada-U.S. Trade Commission is a political body composed of
representatives of both Parties." The principal representative of each Party
is the cabinet-level officer or Minister primarily responsible for international
trade. The Commission supervises the Agreement's implementation,
resolves disputes and oversees its operation.' If the Parties refer a dispute
to it, the Commission may call on such technical advisors it deems necessary,
or on the assistance of a mediator acceptable to both Parties, in an effort to
reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute."1
If the dispute has not been resolved by the Commission within thirty
days, the Commission has two options available: (1) the Commission may
refer the dispute to binding arbitration,' or (2) on request of the Parties,
decide the matter through the use of a panel of experts.7 3
Both the arbitration panel and the panel of experts are chosen by the
Commission from a roster of panelists from both countries who have
expertise in the specific matter under dispute and are not affiliated with or
take instructions from either Party. 4 The panels are composed of five
64. Id. at 294. A measure is defined as including any law, regulation, procedure, requirement
or practice. Id.
65. Id. at 384.
66. Id. at 384.
There have been over a dozen Chapter 18 disputes which have gone before the Commission
to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the issue through consultations. However, there
is no formal register of all these matters. These include: tariff reductions for plywood panels,
wool re-classification, wine and beer pricing and shelving practices, plywood panel standards,
cable retransmission of border-area broadcasting and meat-reinspection, just to name a few.
To determine the success or failure of this consultation process is difficult since the
Commission is not a public body and, thus, has no reporting requirements. All interested parties
have to go on assurances from the respective governments that "matters are well in hand." See
Kalnay, infra note 92-94 and accompanying text.
67. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1805, at 384.
68. Id. at 384.
69. Id. In 1992, the United States Trade Representative on the Canada-U.S. Trade Commis-
sion was Ambassador Carla A. Hills and the Canadian Trade Representative was Michael
Wilson, Minister of Trade.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 384.
72. Id. art. 1806(1)(b), at 384-85. If the dispute involves actions taken pursuant to Chapter
Eleven (Emergency Action), the Commission must refer the dispute to a binding arbitration
panel.
73. Id. art. 1807(2), at 385.
74. Id. art. 1807(l), at 385.
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members and are binational in character.75
The decisions of the arbitration panel are final and binding.76 If a Party
fails to implement in a timely fashion the findings of a binding arbitration
panel and the Parties are unable to agree on appropriate compensation or
remedial action, then the other Party shall have the right to suspend the
application of equivalent benefits of the Agreement to the non-complying
Party."
An expert panel, however, can only make recommendations to the
Commission; it does not have the power to bind the Parties.' The expert
panel submits an initial report of its preliminary findings and recommen-
dations within three months and, where feasible, the Parties are to be given
an opportunity to comment.' Then, the expert panel has an additional
thirty days to reconsider its initial report and issue a final report to the
Commission.' Normally, the Commission agrees to a resolution of the
dispute that conforms to the recommendations of the expert panel.81
Whenever possible, the resolution is to be either non-implementation or
removal of a measure not conforming with the Agreement or, failing such a
resolution, compensation.' If the Commission is unable to reach an
agreement on a resolution to the dispute within thirty days and a Party
considers that its rights or benefits under the agreement are being impaired
by the implementation or continuance of the measure at issue, then that Party
may suspend the application of equivalent benefits until a resolution is
reached.'
To date, only two complaints, one by Canada and one by the United
States, have been initiated and completed under Chapter Eighteen dispute
resolution procedures." Coincidentally, both these complaints involved a
legislative measure taken by each Party to protect a fish product within their
respective fishing industries which had the effect of economic protectionism.
The first complaint was brought to a binational dispute resolution panel
of experts for adjudication under Chapter Eighteen by the United States.
75. Id. At least two of the panelists shall be citizens of Canada and at least two shall be
citizens of the United States. Each Party shall choose two members of the panel and the
Commission shall endeavor to agree on the fifth who will chair the panel. In all cases, panelists
are to be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment and, where
appropriate, have expertise in the particular matter under consideration. Id.
76. Id. art. 1806(3), at 385.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 1807(8), at 385-86.
79. Id. art. 1807(5), at 385.
80. Id. art. 1807(6), at 385.
81. Id. art. 1807(8), at 385-86.
82. Id.
83. Id. art. 1807(9), at 386.
84. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Binational Secretariat, U.S. Section, Status
Report for January 1992 [hereinafter Status Report].
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This case, In re Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring,5
resulted when Canada adopted new legislation that required specified fish to
be landed in Canada prior to their exportation. The United States' position
was that this measure was an export restriction contrary to Canada's
obligations under the GATT (which is incorporated into the FTA by refer-
ence). In a unanimous decision, the panel held that Canada's landing
requirement was an export restriction in violation of Canada's GATT
obligations and thus, in violation with its FTA obligations.
The second complaint, Lobsters from Canada,' was initiated by
Canada. In this case, Canada argued that a U.S. measure, that imposed size
limitations on live lobsters imported from Canada, was an import restriction
contrary to the United States' FTA and GATT obligations because it placed
an absolute ban on the importation of Canadian lobsters below the specified
size limitation. The expert panel, in a contentious 3-2 vote,"' determined
that the size limitation was not an import restriction in violation of either
GATT or FTA obligations.
With only two cases having been settled before binational panels under
Chapter Eighteen dispute resolution procedures, it is premature to draw firm
conclusions regarding their success. For example, neither of the above
controversies ended with the submittal of the panels' decisions. Rather, both
governments continued to negotiate the respective issues. Ultimately, these
issues were settled as a result of further compromises reached during these
subsequent negotiations. Nevertheless, it does appear that the binational
panels are consistently interpreting, implementing, and/or Canada-U.S. FTA
obligations by applying developed GATT principles, precedents and obliga-
tions." However, while the panels seem to be helping any subsequent
negotiation by resolving legal questions, it is not clear whether the use of
binational panels of experts hastens or retards the final resolutions of
disputes.' Because of the politicized nature of disputes arising under this
Chapter, it remains to be seen how important a role binational panel dispute
resolution will play in government-to-government disputes.91
Beyond the dispute resolution activities of the panels themselves, it
85. In re Canada's Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, 12 I.T.R.D. 1026 (BNA)
(Binat'l Panel 1989).
86. See Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 407, at 310.
87. Lobsters from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1653 (BNA) (Binat'l Panel 1990).
88. The decision was reportedly split along national lines. Judith Bello, et al., U.S. Trade Law
and Policy Series No. 18: Midterm Report on Binational Dispute Settlement Under the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter Midterm Report], 25 INT'L LAW. 489, 498
(1991).
89. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapters 18 and 19 of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, An Interim Appraisal 67-77 (Dec. 1990), FORUM
on Binational Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement held
by the Administrative Conference of the United States (April 23, 1991).
90. Id. at 84-85.
91. Id. at v.
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appears that the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission is assuming the more
important role as the arbiter of Canada-U.S. trade disputes" Although
there is no formal register of all the matters put before the Commission, over
a dozen disputes have been discussed before the Commission.' Perhaps,
because each government is represented on the Commission, on an equal
basis, by its own trade representative, the Parties believe that their interests
or concerns are better addressed and resolved through the Commission than
referred to the panel process. Regardless of which methodology is used, it
appears that progress has been made because assurances have been received
from both governments that matters regarding Canada-U.S. trade disputes
"are well in hand."'
2. Binational panel dispute settlement in antidumping
and countervailing duty determinations
Chapter Nineteen contains the dispute procedures for antidumping95 and
countervailing duty' actions. Initially, the Agreement does not change the
existing domestic substantive laws of either Party on antidumping and
countervailing duties. 7 However, the Agreement does oblige the Parties,
within five to seven years, to develop a new system of rules for dealing with
the use of government subsidies and unfair anti-competitive pricing practices
(such as dumping) as applied to their bilateral trade" in order to stop the
92. Michael Kalnay, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and North American Free Trade:
Prospects and Portents 1, FORUM on Binational Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement held by the Administrative Conference of the United States
(Apr. 23, 1991).
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
95. Article VI of GATT defines dumping
as the act where products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than the normal value of the products. A product is considered as
being introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal
value, if the price of the product exported form one country to another (1) is less than
the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when
destined for consumption in the exporting country, or (2) in the absence of domestic
price, is less than either a) the highest comparable price for the like product for
export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or b) the cost of
production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for
selling cost and profit.
In order to offset or prevent dumping, a country may levy a duty on any dumped product
an anti-dumping duty. GAT, supra note 12, at 212.
96. Under Article VI of GATT, the term "countervailing duty" is understood to mean a special
duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly,
on the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise. GAiT, supra note 12, at 212.
97. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1902, at 386.
98. Id. arts. 1906 & 1907, at 390.
16
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use of domestic trade laws as protectionist weapons.9 Once the Parties
have agreed to the new set of trade rules, use of the Chapter Nineteen will
no longer be required."
Until the new system is in place, each Party has the right to apply its
antidumping and countervailing duty laws to goods imported from the
territory of the other Party."'1 Also, each Party's legislature may subse-
quently change these laws during the interim period." However, there is
a requirement to notify the other Party of any proposed changes to domestic
antidumping and countervailing duty laws and each Party will be exempted
from such legislative changes unless otherwise specifically stated in the
legislation itself."
During the interim period, should disputes arise from final decisions by
domestic administering authorities"° under national antidumping or
countervailing duty applications, the complaining Party"0 5 can choose to
99. Ferguson, supra note 34, at 327. Because tariffs are agreed to up front, the exporter is
able to factor the additional costs of a tariff into his or her decision-making process. However,
with antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the exporter is less able to include these costs
into his or her decision-making process since the application of these laws are a result of a
number of different factors that cannot be determined in advance. The uncertainty generated by
this process affects existing trade and also impairs future trade. Id.
100. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1906, at 390.
The new system of rules are to be developed by a bilateral Working Group. This Working
Group met in November 1989, and again in May 1990. As of this writing, no further meetings
have been scheduled. Midterm Report, supra note 88, at 512.
101. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1902, at 386.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Domestic petitions requesting antidumping and countervailing duty actions in the United
States are initiated by an interested party, including a trade association, firm, certified or
recognized union or group of workers, which is representative of the industry that is claiming
to be injured by the imported good. These petitions are filed with the International Trade
Administration (ITA) of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce and the International Trade Commission
(ITC); the U.S. domestic administering authorities. The ITA determines whether a good from
Canada is being sold in the United States at less than fair value (dumped) or whether a subsidy
exists as required. Simultaneously, the ITC determines whether a dumped or subsidized good
from Canada is being imported in such increased quantities so as to constitute material injury
to the domestic industry. If both the ITA and the ITC make affirmative determinations, then
either an antidumping duty or countervailing duty is assessed against the imported goods. Tariff
Act of 1930, secs. 731-740, as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, secs. 1316-1311, 19 U.S.C. § 1673-1673i (1988).
It is this final decision by either the ITA or ITC that a party can choose to appeal to a
binational dispute settlement panel. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act of 1988, sec. 401(c), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(g)(2) (West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
Canada's domestic procedures for antidumping and countervailing duty actions are similar
to those detailed above. Debra P. Steger, The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Comparison with the Existing System, in UNDERSTANDING THE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 49, 58 (Donald M. McRae & Debra P. Steger eds., 1988).
105. In the United States, a party who was an interested party to the domestic administering
agency determination on the antidumping or countervailing duty action may request binational
panel review under Chapter Nineteen of such determination by filing a request with the United
States Secretary. Receipt of the request by the United States Secretary is deemed to be a request
for binational panel review by the United States and the Government is obligated to represent
this interested party before the binational panel. Absent a request by an interested party, the
17
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appeal such a decision to a binational dispute settlement panel instead ofjudicial review by domestic courts."° These binational panels are estab-
lished separately from the general panel of experts under Chapter Eighteen,
Article 1806 discussed above, although the procedures for selection and
function are similar. 107
Detailed procedures are specified within the Agreement itself to provide
the mechanics of review by a binational panel."° Essentially, a binational
panel determines whether the national trade law remedies of the importing
country were applied correctly and fairly by the domestic administering
authorities. 9 If the panel finds that the domestic trade law remedies have
been correctly and fairly applied, using the same standards of review as
would have been applied by a reviewing court in the importing country, then
the original determination made by the domestic administering authorities
stands." 0 However, if the panel finds that the domestic administering
authority erred, the panel can remand the dispute back to the administering
authority to correct the error and make a new determination. "' The
Panel's final decision must be issued within 315 days from the date on which
the request for a panel was originally made."' The panel's findings and
decisions are binding on both Parties."'
If after the panel's final decision is issued, a Party alleges that a member
of the panel violated the rules of conduct, the panel seriously departed from
a fundamental rule of procedure or the panel exceeded its authority or
jurisdiction, a Party can invoke an extraordinary challenge procedure." 4
United States Government may not request binational panel review of such determination.
United States-Canada Free Trade Implementation Act of 1988, sec. 401(c), 19 U.S.C.A. §
1516a(g)(8) (West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
In the United States Government vernacular, the interested party requesting binational panel
review is referred to as "the little p party."
106. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904, at 387.
107. William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement Under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in
TRADE-OFFS IN FREE TRADE 173, 177 (Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown eds., 1988).
Panelists are chosen from a roster of fifty willing persons developed by both Parties, twenty-five
are to be citizens of Canada and twenty-five are to be citizens of the United States. The
panelists included on the roster shall be of good character, high standing and repute and shall
be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and general familiarity
with international trade law. Panels must not be affiliated with or take instructions from either
Party.
A majority of the panelists on each panel are to be attorneys in good standing. Each Party
appoints two panelists from the roster, in consultation with the other Party. Each Party has the
right to exercise four peremptory challenges of panelists chosen by the other side. The Parties
shall agree on the selection of the fifth panelist, or chose one by lot. Id. art. 19, Annex 1901.2,
at 393.
108. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 19, Annex 1901, 1901.2, 1903.2, at 393-94.
109. Id. arts. 1904, 1911, at 387, 391.
110. Id. art. 1904(8), at 388.
111. Id.
112. Id. art. 1904(14), at 389.
113. Id. art. 1904(9), at 388.
114. Id. art. 1904(13), at 388-9.
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Under this procedure, a committee of three judges or former judges reviews
the panel's decision and issues a binding determination on the allegations and
on whether a new panel will be required to review the issues.1 5
At the time of this writing, a total of twenty-two complaints and one
extraordinary challenge proceeding, by both Canada and the United States,
have been initiated under the Chapter Nineteen dispute resolution proce-
dures." 6 Seventeen of these complaints are completed, while five com-
plaints and the extraordinary challenge proceeding are pending." 7 Of the
seventeen completed cases, panel review of seven cases were terminated by
mutual consent of the Parties and panel review of one case was consolidated
with another case. The remaining nine completed cases involve:
(i) Red Raspberries from Canada"8
The first request for binational panel review was filed by Canadian
complainants, asking review of an ITA determination that Canadian berry
producers were dumping. The panel unanimously found that the ITA had
erred in its dumping determination and remanded the case to the ITA to redo
its calculations using a methodology directed by the panel. The ITA redid
the calculations and found no dumping.
(i) Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from
Canada'9
Canadian complainants requested two panel reviews. The first panel
reviewed an ITA scope determination and the second panel reviewed a
determination that Canadian manufacturers were dumping replacement parts
for this type paving equipment in the United States. Each panel unanimously
confirmed the respective ITA's determinations, upholding the duty imposed
on the Canadian goods. However, because the amount of duty imposed was
less than the U.S. party thought it should be, this party requested an
extraordinary challenge to the decision. This first request for an extraordi-
nary challenge was ultimately rejected.
115. Id. art. 19, Annex 1904.13, at 395. The members of the extraordinary challenge
committee are selected from a ten-person roster comprised of judges or former judges of a
federal court of the United States or a court of superior jurisdiction of Canada. Each Party shall
name five persons to this roster. Each Party shall select one member from this roster and the
third shall be selected from the roster by the two members chosen by the Parties or, if
necessary, by lot from the roster.
116. Status Report, supra note 84.
117. Id.
118. In re Red Raspberries from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1259 (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l Panel
1989).
In re Red Raspberries from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1652 (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l Panel
1990).
119. Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, 12
I.T.R.D. 1297 (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l Panel 1990).
Replacement Parts for Self-Propelled Bituminous Paving Equipment from Canada, 12
I.T.R.D. 1461 (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l Panel 1990).
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(iii) New Steel Rails, Except Light Rail, from Canada"2
Canadian complainants requested two separate panel reviews of an ITA
affirmative countervailing duty and anti-dumping determinations, respective-
ly. One panel unanimously affirmed the ITA's finding of subsidization of the
Canadian steel rail industry, but not to the extent originally found. This panel
remanded the issue to the ITA for redetermination. The ITA redetermination
reduced the countervailing duty. The other panel, with a four-to-one
majority, upheld the ITA's dumping determination and the antidumping duty
as assessed remained in place.
(iv) New Steel Rails from Canada'
Both Canadian and U.S. complainants requested panel review of
different aspects the ITC's material injury determination in antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations. The panel affirmed, with one dissent in
part, the affirmative determination of material injury, challenged by the
Canadian complainants, and the negative material injury determination,
challenged by the U.S. complainants.
(v) Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada (The Pork Case)22
Of all the cases that have been completed under the Chapter Nineteen
procedures, the most controversy surrounded two Canadian complaints, one
involving dumping and the other involving material injury, regarding pork.
Canadian complainants requested separate panel reviews of ITA determina-
tion that found Canadian pork to be subsidized and an ITC determination of
material injury.
The first panel unanimously upheld the ITA's countervailing duty
determination, but remanded the case back to the ITA to revise downward
120. New Steel Rails, Except Light Rails, from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1412 (BNA) (Dept. of
Com. Countervailing Duty Determination 1989).
New Steel Rails, Except Light Rails, from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1433 (BNA) (Dept. of
Com. Dumping Determination 1989).
New Steel Rails, Except Light Rails, from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1753 (BNA) (Art. 1904
Binat'1 Panel-Countervailing Duty 1990).
New Steel Rails, Except Light Rails, from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 2231 (BNA) (Art. 1904
Binat'l Panel-Dumping and Material Injury 1990).
121. New Steel Rails from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1550 (BNA) (USITC Final Determina-
tion-Material Injury 1989).
New Steel Rails from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1980 (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l Panel 1990).
122. Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 2299 (BNA) (Art. 1904
Binat'l Panel 1990).
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Porkfrom Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1302 (BNA) (Dept. of Com.,
Int'l Trade Admin. 1989).
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 2119 (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l
Panel 1990).
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, 12 I.T.R.D. 1380 (BNA) (USITC Final
Determination - Material Injury 1989).
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. 1024 (BNA) (Remand of
USITC Material Injury Determination 1991).
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. 1291 (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l
Panel 1991).
Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork from Canada, 13 I.T.R.D. 1453 (BNA) (Re-remand of
USITC Material Injury Determination 1991).
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the overall duty calculation. The second panel totally rejected the ITC
determination of material injury, remanding the case back to the ITC for
redetermination. The ITC's redetermination again found material injury.
Again, the panel reversed and remanded. "[Flinally, the ITC bowed to the
decision of the panel, but made clear that it regarded the Panel's decision as6contrary to the facts and the law,' and vowed not to change its practice or
procedure to conform to the view of the Panel."" z
At the time of this writing, while these complaints are deemed complet-
ed, the U.S. government petitioned, and was granted, the right to invoke the
Extraordinary Challenge procedure. This challenge procedure is currently
pending.
(vi) Integral Horsepower Induction Motors"
Both American and Canadian complainants requested panel review of the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal's (CITT) determination which
continued a finding a material injury on induction motors imported into
Canada. The majority of the panel affirmed the CITT's decision, with one
panel member dissenting in part.
With the completion of the above cases, it appears that the Chapter
Nineteen dispute settlement procedures are successful. Generally, the
process has functioned smoothly with panel disputes being conducted
expeditiously." z The panel decisions have been nearly all unanimous,
quelling fears that a voting bloc based on nationality would develop. As
importantly, panel opinions have been thoughtful, thorough, articulate, and
have drawn conclusions that are persuasive. 1  However, as a result of The
Pork Case, some experts believe that legal principles, independent of the
laws of the importing countries and the FTA, are beginning to evolve out of
the panels.127 The new principles involve standards of review, standing,
exhaustion of administrative remedies, reliance on the GATr and GATT
codes authority, and the precedental value of prior panel decisions.,'
Other experts dismiss this notion, believing that, The Pork Case notwithstan-
123. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chapters 18 and 19 of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, An Interim Appraisal 1 (Update, Apr. 1991),
FORUM on Binational Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, held by the Administrative Conference of the United States (Apr. 23, 1991).
124. Integral Horsepower Induction Motors, (CITT Continuation of Injury Finding 1990).
Integral Horsepower Induction Motors, _ I.T.R.D. __ (BNA) (Art. 1904 Binat'l Panel
1991).
125. One trade expert has stated that the Chapter Nineteen panel decisions have, on average,
taking less than half the time as similar review undertaken by the Court of International Trade.
See Lowenfeld, supra note 89, at ii.
126. Id. at iv.
127. James R. Cannon, Jr., Summary of Views 2, FORUM on Binational Dispute Resolution
under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, held by the Administrative Conference of the
United States (Apr. 23, 1991).
128. James R. Cannon, Jr., U.S. -Canad. FTA Article 19 Panels: Are the Binational Panels
Following Their Mandate 1-22, FORUM on Binational Dispute Resolution under the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, held by the Administrative Conference of the United States
(Apr. 23, 1991).
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ding," the panels are not creating independent legal principles." Thus,
overall, it appears that the panels are fairly applying national trade laws,
generating binational confidence in the efficiency and efficacy of the FTA's
dispute settlement procedures."'
Apart from the development of legal principles by Chapter Nineteen
binational arbitration panels, the existence and use of these panels to resolve
disputes generates a United States constitutional issue that remains unre-
solved. The Canada-U.S. FTA provides that the binational panel reviews
will replace domestic judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations made by the administering authorities in the importing country
(either the United States or Canada). 32 The binational panel system is
considered to be unconstitutional by some U.S. legal experts, principally on
the ground that reviews of antidumping and countervailing duty actions must
be undertaken in Article III courts, i.e. in courts where judges have the
salary and tenure protection afforded by Article III of the Constitution. 3
Other U.S. legal experts do not believe this system to be unconstitutional
because the Constitution created only a Supreme Court and the establishment
of appellate jurisdiction was left to Congressional discretion'3
To date, this controversy remains unresolved. Because the Chapter
Nineteen dispute resolution procedures are intended to be an interim system
until the Parties have agreed to the new set of trade rules, immediate
resolution is not mandatory. However, it has been suggested that an
amendment to the Canada-U.S. FTA to allow importers to seek appellate
review of panel decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court would assure compli-
ance with the constitutional requirements.' 35
129. "In the eyes of United States officials, this [The Pork Case panel] was a rogue panel."
Lisa B. Koteen, U.S. -Canada FTA Chapter 19Dispute Settlement: Wat is the Verdict and Can
it be Applied to NAFTA 9, FORUM on Binational Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the U.S-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, held by the Administrative Conference of the United States
(Apr. 23, 1991).
130. William K. Ince & Michele C. Sherman, Observations on the Binational Panel Process
Under Chapter 19 of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement 3, FORUM on Binational Dispute
Resolution Procedures Under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, held by the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States (Apr. 23, 1991).
"On balance, while it may be too early to put the matter to rest, it does not appear that
panels are creating a new body of jurisprudence." Id. at 4.
131. Midterm Report, supra note 88, at 516.
132. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 4, art. 1904, at 387.
133. Davey, supra note 107, at 179.
134. 134 CONG. REC. S16084-92 (daily ed., June 28, 1988) (CRS Reports regarding The
Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, submitted
for publication by Sen. Domenici).
135. Karen H. Albright, Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An
Unconstitutional Preclusion of Article III Review, 5 CONN. J. INT'L L. 317, 351 (1989).
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III. POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL DIFFERENCES
AFFECTING THE USE OF CANADA-U.S. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES IN THE NAFTA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Differences Affecting Mexico-U.S. Trade Relations
"No two nations with such disparate cultures, economic prosperity, and
global power share as long a border as Mexico and the United States."" i
Although the United States also shares a long frontier with Canada, it also
shares a cultural and historical affinity. 3 Therefore, unlike Canada,
Mexico-U.S. relations, particularly their trade relations, must be understood
in the context of mutual suspicion. Mexico and the U.S. have differing
interests and a significant disparity in strengths and needs. 38
One methodology that has been suggested to address the cultural and
historical differences affecting the trade relations between the United States
and Mexico is the implementation of an improved dispute resolution mecha-
nism.139 A first step was taken in this direction when Mexico acceded to
the GATT in 1986."4 A second, and even more important, step in the
direction of improved dispute resolution was taken when the United States
136. Michael W. Gordon, Mexico and the United States: Common Frontier-Uncommon
Relationship, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 171 (1987).
137. Id. at 172.
138. Frank J. Macchiarola, Mexico as a Trading Partner, 37 INT'L TRADE: THE CHANGING
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 90 (1990). Historically, the relationship between the United
States and Mexico has not been a warm one. This lack of warmth can be traced to the two
countries' stormy past. "For instance, every Mexican schoolchild learns that the United States
invaded Mexico more than a century ago and seized half of the country's territory, and Mexican
history books are replete with references to U.S. economic exploitation." Therefore, most
Mexicans tend to view the United States as the culprit whenever something unfortunate happens
to Mexico.
Conversely, most Americans know little of the real Mexico, seeing it only as corrupt,
antidemocratic and inefficient. Mexico gains attention in the United States only when its internal
problems threaten to impact the United States, as with illegal immigration, or its foreign policies
tent to frustrate U.S. foreign policy goals, Mexico's policies toward Central America.
Regardless of whether these American beliefs about Mexico are accurate or not, they influence
attitudes and policy.
What Mexico wants most from the United States is cooperation with its goals of achieving
economic growth and improving its political and social situation. Towards reaching these goals,
Mexico wants access to the U.S. market for its goods and services with minimum trade
restrictions.
On its side, the United States wants Mexico to remain a socially stable country, as a buffer
between it and the politically and socially restless countries in Central America. WEINTRAUB,
supra note 8, at 52-63.
139. Rachel McCulloch, The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 37 INT'L TRADE:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 79, 87 (1990).
140. For general discussion of Mexico's accession to the GATT, see Richard D. English, The
Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 339
(1988).
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and Mexico signed the U.S.-Mexico Framework Agreement.""1 However,
as U.S.-Mexico trade relations have continued to evolve toward free trade,
it has become evident that neither the dispute resolution mechanisms in the
GATT or the Framework Agreement would be sufficient. 42
The dispute resolution mechanisms under both the GATT and the
Framework Agreement are insufficient to address U.S.-Mexico trade
relations as they evolve toward free trade because both use ad hoc mecha-
nisms that rely only on consultations and consensus to achieve the resolution
of disputes.' z In addition, any recommendations that result from the use
of either of these procedures are either not binding on the Parties or are
rarely enforced. 1" Because of the comprehensiveness of the obligations,
a free trade agreement requires sharply defined dispute resolution procedures
that are less politicized, more procedurally consistent and objective, and are
binding on the Parties. "2
"Not long ago, free trade was considered a very American idea that
good Mexicans didn't promote in public. More often, they denounced it as
a U.S. plot to undermine Mexico's economy." 1" The debate in Mexico
on bilateral free trade is a combination of concerns about dependency and
domination, its political, economic and legal ramifications, compounded by
a historical cultural animosity toward the United States and the practical
concern about who wins and who loses from free trade.14 7
Mexico's concerns regarding the creation of the NAFTA are similar to
those of Canada during the creation of the Canada-U.S. FTA.'" Speci-
141. Mexico-United States: Framework Understanding on Bilateral Trade and Investment,
signed Nov. 6 1987, 27 I.L.M. 438 (1988). This Framework Agreement was important because
it served as the first formal bilateral agreement for resolving disputes specifically between the
United States and Mexico on trade issues.
For a further discussion on the evolution and accomplishments of the U.S.-Mexico
Framework Agreement's consultative mechanisms, see Guy C. Smith, The United States-Mexico
Framework Agreement: Implications for Bilateral Trade, 20 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 655
(1989).
142. SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, FREE TRADE WITH MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES? 1 (1984).
143. For a discussion of the GATT dispute resolution procedures, see generally JOHN H.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT' ch. 8 (1969); I. Bael, The GATT Dispute
Settlement Procedure, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 67-7 (1988); J. Waincymer, GA7T Dispute
Settlement: An Agenda for Evaluation and Reform, 14 N.C.J. OF INT'L AND COM. REG. 121-33
(1989); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GA7T, 11 FORDHAM INT'L LAW J. 51-109
(1987).
144. See supra note 143.
145. Robert P. Parker, Dispute Settlement in the GA7T and the Canada-US. Free Trade
Agreement, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 83, 93 (1989).
146. Marjorie Miller, Salinas is Eager to Nail Down a Pact, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1990, at A-3.
147. WEINTRAUB, supra note 142, at 24. Interestingly, there has been a shift in public
sentiment toward free trade. Recent national surveys show that 62% of all Mexicans favor a
free-trade agreement with the United States. They believe that it will create jobs and give them
greater access to more and better quality goods and services. Wayne A. Cornelius, Mexico's
New Revolution: Economic Refon is Remaking Mexico, But Political Liberalization is Needed
to Guarantee the Results, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 2, 1992, C-5.
148. See generally Macchiarola, supra note 138.
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fically, the political, cultural and legal differences of concern to Mexico
include:
1. maintenance of national sovereignty,
2. eliminating the arbitrary amendment and biased application of U.S.
domestic trade laws,
3. reduction on political interference in a dispute resolution process,
4. loss of cultural identity,
5. procedural neutrality, efficacy, and efficiency, and
6. enforcement of rights and obligations under a FTA.
Therefore, one aspect of the Canada-U.S. FTA that could be applied
profitably to Mexico to address these political, cultural and legal differences
is the dispute resolution procedures. 149 However, these differences are
considered to affect the United States and Mexico more profoundly than they
did the United States and Canada." Thus, the existing Canada-U.S. FTA
dispute resolution procedures will have to be reevaluated to determine
whether they currently address and resolve the political, cultural and legal
differences affecting Mexico-U.S. trade relations or whether they need to be
revised and tailored for application to the NAFTA.
B. Political Differences
Traditionally, the style of U.S. official conduct toward Mexico tends to
follow the pattern of a superior dealing with an inferior. 1' As a result,
Mexicans are deeply concerned that a movement toward free trade with the
United States is that nation's latest attempt to exercise political hegemony
over Mexico. 52 Mexico fears that free trade would inevitably and
ultimately lead to U.S. political domination over Mexico, or, at the very
least, allow the United States to intrude on Mexico's national sovereignty
149. See McCulloch, supra note 139.
150. Id. "The United States is a world power, and Mexico is a struggling developing country.
Annual per capita income in the United States is now about $18,000; in Mexico less that $2,000.
The Mexican culture is hispanic, and that of the United States, while complex, derives much of
its sustenance from British, Western Europe, non-Latin traditions. Mexico was the territorial
loser and the United States the gainer in the nineteenth century war. WEINTRAUB, supra note
8, at 5.
151. WEINTRAUB, supra note 142, at 19. Officials of the United States often denigrate
Mexican authorities in ways that they would never do with other allies. For example, John
Gavin, U.S. ambassador to Mexico from 1981 to 1986 regularly and publicly lectured the
Mexican government on its policy shortcomings. William van Raab, commissioner of U.S.
customs, openly charged Mexican officials with complicity in drug trafficking during a Senate
hearing. In 1985, a U.S. senate vote threatened reprisals against Mexico based on an
unconfirmed, unverified (and ultimately false) report that a Soviet warship was about to visit a
Mexican port. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 7.
152. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at I.
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through interference with the domestic political system and policy deci-
sions. 53 For example, many Mexicans believe that a free trade agreement
would allow the United States to meddle with Mexico's sovereignty by
demanding, or at least trying to influence, national political system reform
out of American perceptions of non-democratic electoral dominance, fraud
and intimidation."l Further, surveys of Mexican attitudes suggest that the
United States is seen as treating Mexico unfairly in trade."' 5 Many
Mexicans envision that a free trade agreement would not give Mexico much
influence over U.S. decision-making on trade issues or the help to eliminate
the biased application of U.S. trade laws against Mexico. In fact, it appears
that many Mexicans actually expect the reverse to occur-that U.S. authori-
ties would obtain greater influence over Mexican trade policies such as
Mexican oil and gas production."
On the other side, U.S. labor unions and producers, both agricultural
and manufacturing, are concerned that the NAFTA would entice some U.S.
companies to move to Mexico, resulting in competition with more cheaply
produced Mexican goods and causing the loss of American jobs.'5 7 In
153. Id. at 180.
154. M. Delal Baer, Salinas's Achilles' Heel, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 5,
1990, at 19. Mexico is a federally organized republic composed of thirty-one states and a
Federal District. However, in Mexico, as opposed to the United States, the total dominance of
the federal government over all facets of Mexico's political, economic, cultural and legal
systems is overwhelming.
While powers of the federal government are constitutionally separated into three indepen-
dent branches, executive, legislative and judicial, the executive branch is the real center of
Mexican political power. At the head of the executive branch and holder of this undisputed
power is the president. The power and influence of the president derives from his influence over
Mexico's one official political party-the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). The PRI
controls all branches of the federal government and almost all state governments. While other
political pasties do exist, their combined strength and influence is only a fraction of that of the
PRI. Harry K. Wright, Mexican Government, Foreign Enterprise in Mexico 12 (1971).
Since its founding over sixty years ago, the PRI had never lost a presidential or gubernato-
rial election. The PRI has been accused of retaining its dominance over the Mexican govern-
ment through electoral manipulation, coercion and outright fraud. Participants on both sides of
the border have stated that Mexico's political system needs reform to become more democratic,
eliminating electoral fraud and holding "free elections." USITC Pub. 2326, supra note 24, at
1-4.
However, the political winds in Mexico are starting to shift significantly. In 1988, the PRI
lost four senatorial seats and, in 1989, it lost one governorship. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at
6. Most recently, in the national elections held in August, 1991, the PRI lost another senatorial
seat and the PRI governor-elect in the state of Guanajuato had to resign over vote fraud protests.
A member of one of the opposition parties took over as interim governor. James W. Silver, The
PRI is Losing its Iron Grip on Baja California, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 2, 1992, at
C-5. Ultimately, the PRI does retain control of the presidency and the two houses of the
legislature, but it is a more tenuous, a more shared control, than at any time during the past
sixty years. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 6.
For a in-depth discussion on Mexico and the Mexican political system, see generally ALAN
RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS (1984).
155. WEINTRAUB, supra note 142, at 17.
156. Id. at 180.
157. Benjamin Shore, Bush, Salinas Schedule Talks on Trade Pact, SAN DIEGO UNION, Mar.
26, 1991, at A-Il. Mexico's average wage is about one-seventh that of the United States'. Id.
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addition, U.S. environmental groups argue that, even though Mexico has
environmental laws comparable to those in the United States, Mexico's lax
enforcement of these laws would attract American industries and farms who
don't want to bear the costs of pollution control and/or stop using pesticides
banned in the United States.
158
Moreover, in the past few years U.S.-Mexican relations have been
strained by public accusations in the United States that the Mexican Govern-
ment is corrupt from top to bottom. 59 A certain amount of corruption is
found all countries."W But, in Mexico, corruption is essential to the opera-
tion and survival of the political system-the system has never lived without
corruption and would disintegrate or change beyond recognition if it tried to
do so."' However, the United States, after recent U.S. government
scandals such as Abscam, Iran-Contra affair, Keating Five (the Savings and
Loan debacle) and HUD-gate, does not have clean hands with regard to
corrupt practices. Sometimes what the United States calls corruption in
Mexico is acceptable practice at home. For example, the practices that
protect the seats of incumbents in the U.S. House of Representatives is not
considered corruption. Nor is the practice of accepting campaign contribu-
tions and then voting in favor of those interests considered corrupt. Thus,
this criticism implies a moral superiority that the United States should not
assume.
The inclusion of the dispute resolution procedures from the Canada-U.S.
FTA into NAFTA would help to mitigate these political differences affecting
the trade relations of the United States and Mexico. First, the inclusion of
Mexico in a trilateral (Mexico-Canada-U.S.) Trade Commission would
158. Benjamin Shore, Environmental Issues Enter Free-Trade Talk, SAN DIEGO UNION, Mar.
21, 1991, at E-1. The U.S. was supposed to be pursuing the setting of environmental standards
with Mexico under a binational commission created in November 1990, but nothing has been
done yet. Id.
159. Keith S. Rosenn, Corruption in Mexico: Implications for Foreign Policy, 18 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 95, 96-100 (1987-88).
160. Id. at 95.
161. ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS 113 (1984). Corruption is defined as an act done
with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979).
In Mexican culture, the lines between corrupt and non-corrupt behavior are blurred by long
established traditions and cultural values. ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS 114 (1984).
Mexican officials have difficulty in admitting, especially to foreigners, that corruption is
essential to the operation and survival of the Mexican system. Id. at 113. However, a number
of Mexican writers have explored various aspects of the corruption within Mexico. For
example, Octavio Paz, one of Mexico's leading essayists, has written about the role of
corruption within the Mexican "psychie" in The Labyrinth of Solitude (1961). Also, Jose
Gonzales revealed, in a short book, Lo Negro del Negro Durazo, (which became one of the
biggest best sellers in Mexican history) the extent of corruption within the Federal Judicial
Police. Id. at 113-20. Even Mexican political figures have finally had to acknowledge the
problem of corruption within the system. For example, in his 1982 presidential campaign,
Miguel de la Madrid stressed the theme that "moral renovation" would be one of the cornerstone
goals of his administration. Also, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Mexico's current president,
removed two high officials within his government because of alleged corruption. WEINTRAUB,
supra note 8, at 58.
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address Mexico's national sovereignty concerns because it would provide a
permanent forum for communication and consultation between the govern-
ments to avoid disputes and generally act as a guardian of each Party's
national interests under the NAFTA. As importantly, each Party would be
represented on the Commission, on an equal basis, by their own appointed
cabinet-level officer or minister responsible for international trade.
Second, Mexico could gain influence over U.S. decision-making on or
application of trade laws because the dispute resolution procedures would
allow a Party to notify the other in writing whenever actual or proposed
legislation, regulation, governmental procedures or practice of the other
Party's is or would be inconsistent with FTA's goals, rights or benefits.
This procedure provides an early warning system of potential and latent trade
problems between the Parties. Thus, if either Party believes that any such
action taken by the other is inconsistent with the FTA, such as interference
in non-FTA matters like domestic political elections, the other party can be
officially notified of the inconsistency and the Parties can attempt, through
consultations, to resolve the issue amicably up front.
Third, if a dispute does arise over the interpretation or application of the
provisions of the agreement, national sovereignty would again be protected
because the complaining Party can choose, at their discretion, to resolve the
dispute using either GATT or the FTA's dispute resolution procedures.
Fourth, should the complaining party choose to resolve the dispute under
the FTA's procedures, the trilateral Trade Commission would have the power
to appoint either binding arbitration panels or panels of experts, composed
of unaffiliated experts from both nations to arbitrate or adjudicate the dispute.
By settling disputes through these panels, the national interests of Mexico are
preserved because the panels provide a neutral forum in which the Parties
can assert their respective national trade policies.
Fifth, the inclusion of dispute resolution procedures from Chapter
Nineteen of the Canada-U.S. FTA would protect Mexico from the arbitrary
amendment and biased application of U.S. domestic trade laws for protec-
tionist purposes. Mexico would have to be consulted in advance regarding
proposed U.S. trade law amendments and the U.S. would have to be
consulted about Mexican trade law amendments. Moreover, disputes
regarding the application and amendment of these trade laws by either Party
are subject to review by binational arbitration panels, replacing the allegedly
biased domestic judicial review and appeal procedures. Therefore, Mexico's
influence on U.S. trade decisions would increase while its influence on non-
FTA domestic decisions would remain unaffected. The same would be true
for the United States.
Lastly, national sovereignty would, again, be protected when a decision
of the binational panel went against one of the Parties since that Party can
choose how to conform to the recommendations made by the panel. The
panel's recommendations can be implemented by either (1) non-implementa-
tion of or removing the measure or domestic determination, or (2) by paying
the other Party compensation, keeping the measure or determination in place.
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The inclusion of the dispute resolution procedures from the Canada-U.S.
FTA into the NAFTA would not as easily address the concerns of the United
States. The concerns of both labor and environmental groups involve
fundamental "social charter" issues that many trade analysts believe should
be dealt with outside of a free trade agreement." a  As a result of this
opposition to the free trade agreement with Mexico, the Bush administration
is discussing with Mexican officials the possibility of negotiating a separate
agreement covering workers' wages, rights and safety as well as environmen-
tal controls. 1"
However, the United States' concern over corruption would be effective-
ly addressed by the inclusion of the dispute resolution procedures from the
Canada-U.S. FTA into the NAFTA. Because the binational panels would be
composed of panelists selected by the Parties from a roster of persons who
were included on that roster because of their objectivity, reliability, sound
judgment and non-affiliation with either Party, the chances of corruption
influencing any decisions is greatly reduced. Also, in disputes resolved by
a panel of experts rather than by binding arbitration, it would be the trilateral
Trade Commission's responsibility to implement any panel recommendations,
further insulating the dispute resolution process from potential corruption.
Finally, where a binational arbitration panel settles a dispute regarding the
amendment or application of domestic trade laws, if either Party alleges that
a panel member violated any rules of conduct, that Party could invoke an
extraordinary challenge procedure under which a binational committee of
three judges or former judges would review the panel's decision and issue a
binding determination on the allegations and remand the dispute back to
another panel for reconsideration if necessary.
In summary, the inclusion of the dispute resolution procedures from the
Canada-U.S. FTA in the resultant NAFTA would address and be an affirma-
tive step toward mitigating the political differences that affect the United
States and Mexico in their trade relations. While each side would lose some
national sovereignty under the resultant NAFTA, they would gain bilateral
influence over and parity in their trade relations.
C. Cultural Differences
The fear in Mexico is that in an unbalanced triad such as would exist
under a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada, Mexico
would lose its cultural identity."6 Many Mexicans cannot come to terms
with the growing cultural penetration of the American way of life into
Mexican society and believe that free trade would render them powerless to
162. Bennett, supra note 1.
163. Shore, supra note 157, at A-I.
164. WEINTRAUB, supra note 142, at 123.
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prevent total U.S. domination of Mexico's cultural identity and policies."t '
More critically, many Mexicans believe that the cultural differences between
the United States and Mexico in history, religion, language, and race would
complicate Mexico's relationship with the United States under the
NAFTA. 16 Because of these differences the United States does not see
Mexicans as they really are, but rather as caricatures which represent
mythical stereotypes learned in Saturday morning cartoons, movies and
comic books.167 This view of Mexico has led U.S. trade officials to
conduct their trade relations with and to apply domestic trade laws to Mexico
with an attitude of disdain-the superior dealing with an inferior. 1 As a
result, there is a basic distrust of the United States in Mexico, making
Mexicans wary that the NAFTA will only serve to continue this unbalanced
relationship and never allow Mexico to achieve the cultural respect and parity
with the United States it feels it should be accorded. 1"
On the other side, U.S. trade analysts believe that free trade would
strengthen Mexico's economy by promoting industrial efficiency and job
creation, thus, making Mexico's cultural identity stronger than it is now."7
U.S. trade analysts have also stated that because "[Miexico's 'culture is so
strong and distinctive,' its fear of U.S. domination should be minimal." 7'
Further, these analysts regard the impact of different languages, history and
customs of Mexico as having a negligible affect on any resultant FTA.
Mexico already conducts its trade relations with the United States in English
and, since most Mexican trade officials were educated in the United States,
they have a basic understanding of the American culture and practices.'1
The inclusion of the dispute resolution procedures from the Canada-U.S.
FTA into the NAFTA cannot, by itself, preserve Mexico's cultural identity
or mitigate cultural differences and racial stereotypes. However, these
165. RIDING, supra note 161, at 316. Many Mexican analysts believe that the cultural
penetration of American way of life has adversely affected the Mexican language, values,
consumption, aspirations, living habits and social mores. This cultural infection most often
results from flow of ideas across the media and from the flow of people across the border.
American television and radio programs are available in most of Mexico. In addition, a large
number of Mexican are educated at U.S. universities and colleges. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8,
at 14, 164-65.
166. RIDING, supra note 161, at 316.
167. Gordon, supra note 136, at 172. Examples of such caricatures include "Speedy
Gonzales," "The Frito Bandito," "The Cisco Kid," and an innumerable list of "bad guys" in
American westerns.
168. D. Ross GANDY, TWENTY KEYS TO MExIcO: DOOR TO LATIN AMERICA 39-42 (1991).
"For a century Mexicans have moaned that they are 'too far from God and too close to the
United States'." Id. Probably the main generator of U.S. protectionist policies toward Mexico
is the U.S. Congress. "Protectionist proposals made in the U.S. Congress are limited only by
the imaginations of members of Congress and their interested constituents." WEINTRAUB, supra
note 8, at 83-84.
169. GANDY, supra note 168, at 39-42.
170. WEINTRAUB, supra note 142, at 123.
171. USITC Pub. 2326, supra note 24, at 1-6.
172. Id.
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procedures would aid in reducing Mexico's concerns by helping to build and
strengthen the respect and trust between the United States and Mexico that
would be mandatory for successful trade relations under the NAFTA. For
example, the establishment of a trilateral trade Commission would provide
Mexico with a permanent forum in which it could assert its concerns over
cultural identity or policies affected by any U.S. measures taken under the
NAFTA on a equal basis. If a dispute did arise over a measure taken or
over the amendment or application of domestic trade laws, the use of
binational dispute settlement panels, composed, in part, of Mexican trade
experts, would ensure that the cultural differences between the Parties would
not affect the fair implementation and application of the NAFTA's rights and
benefits. Also, if Mexico believed that a panel member violated any rules
of conduct, Mexico could invoke an extraordinary challenge procedure.
Moreover, if a binational panel decided that Mexico had implemented a
cultural measure not in conformance with the NAFTA, Mexico could choose
to pay compensation rather than removing it. This would allow Mexico to
preserve important cultural policies if need be and, yet, uphold its rights and
benefits under the NAFTA.
In summary, the inclusion of the dispute resolution procedures from the
Canada-U.S. FTA into the NAFTA would aid in protecting Mexico's cultural
identity and policies and eliminating the unbalanced trade relationship
between the United States and Mexico because these nations would be
required to manage their free trade obligations and resolve disputes on an
equal basis. The tradition of distrust can be overcome because of the equal
representation and cooperation on both sides engendered by the dispute
resolution procedures.
D. Legal Differences
The trade relationship between the United States and Mexico has been
one of constant friction, with each nation making mutual recriminations about
each other's trading practices and, in particular, about the implementation
and application of their respective trade law remedies. 3  Although the
trade laws in both the United States and Mexico are similar, as they are
based on principles adopted in the GATT, it is the interpretation and weight
given the economic and legal differences reviewed and applied during the
trade action proceeding that can differ between the two counties."4
173. WEINTRAUB, supra note 142, at 39.
174. Ernesto Rubio del Cueto, Countervailing Duties Affecting United States-Mexican Trade,
12 HOUSToN INT'L L.J. 323, 327-30 (1990). The Mexican trade laws are the result of a
combination of international legal institutions, such as GAIT, and Mexican tax and customs
laws. The main component of these trade laws is the Ley Reglamentaaria del Articulo 131 de
la Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en Material de Comercio Exterior (Ley
Reglamentaria). The Ley Reglarnentaria contains the standing requirements, formal prerequi-
sites, and procedures which allow an interested party to obtain relief dumped or subsidized
imports. It also provides procedures for the review and revocation of dumping/subsidy and
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Mexico perceives the legal administration and application U.S. trade law,
both within the domestic administering agencies and within the judicial
appeal process, as biased against Mexican firms. 75 Specifically, Mexican
officials believe the U.S. domestic process for settling bilateral trade disputes
is unpredictable, time consuming, expensive, and lacks objectivity and
neutrality due to political interference. 76 The United States holds similar
opinions regarding Mexico's implementation and application of its domestic
trade law remedies, most often complaining of inadequate or unfair proce-
dures and unenforced decisions.'"
Unlike the United States, Mexican law has no threshold constitutional
problems to overcome before the dispute resolution procedures contained in
the NAFTA could be included into the domestic legal system. Although the
1917 Mexican Constitution establishes a Federalist system with three separate
branches of government, it also fosters the transfer of centralized power from
the other two branches to the Executive branch, in particular the presi-
dent." Thus, the Mexican president can, arguably, more easily amend the
Constitution or enact changes to Mexican law by executive decree in order
to implement domestically an international agreement." 7 This means that,
in Mexico, the lack of judicial review of panel decisions does not have the
same fundamental constitutional implications as it does in the United States.
However, in all likelihood, neither the Mexican Constitution nor domestic
trade laws will require fundamental change as Mexico's substantive and
administrative laws already recognize the right of parties to use and enforce
the settlement of disputes through arbitration panels, often without the same
possibility of judicial review by the higher Mexican courts as in the U.S."
material injury determinations made by the domestic administrating authorities-the Ministry of
Cornmerce and Industrial Development (SECOFI) and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
(SHCP).
The Reglanento contra Practicas Desleales de Comnercio Internacional is the body of
administrative regulations apply the Ley Reglanentaria, including investigative procedures that
are to be followed in order to determine the existence of dumping and subsidies, the application
of the injury test, and the implementation of antidumping and countervailing duties. Andres
Gonzalez Sandoval, A Mexican Perspective on Unfair Trade Laws (1991) (unpublished paper on
file with the American Bar Association, Section of International Law and Practice).
175. Cueto, supra note 174, at 330-33.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. GuILLERMO FLORIS MARGADANT S., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF MEXICAN
LAW 288 (1983).
179. Id. at 287-90. Rodolpho Sandoval, Legal Issues with Respect to Free Trade Between
United States and Mexico, 19 I.J.L. 1. 91, 96 (1991).
180. Eduardo Siqueiros T., Legal Framework for the Sale of Goods into Mexico, 12 HOUSTON
INT'L L.J. 291, 321-22 (1990). The Mexican trade laws are very young when compared to
those of the United States. However, despite having emerged from a different legal scheme,
Mexico has incorporated into its trade laws many of the same basic concepts found in the U.S.
laws. It also imposes rights and burdens on the parties in substantially the same way as the
United States.
In the first six years since the inception of the Ley Reglamentaria and its accompanying
regulations, the Mexican authorities have processed or taken some sort of administration action
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The inclusion of appropriate dispute resolution procedures from the
Canada-U.S. FTA into the NAFTA would address the legal factors affecting
the United States and Mexico their trade relations. First, one of the primary,
although often forgotten, goals of an effective dispute resolution process is
to avoid disputes in the first place. The establishment of a trilateral trade
commission would provide a permanent forum for communication and
consultation between the governments to avoid disputes. The Commission
would encourage the Parties to notify and consult each other up front on
potential trade issues, preempting the development of full-fledged trade
disputes in the future. As a result, the number of disputes would be reduced,
reinforcing the equal level of cooperation and trust between the United States
and Mexico.
Second, if a dispute did develop, the use of either the binational panels
of experts or the binational arbitration panels, as determined by the nature
of the dispute being settled, would reduce the bias in the administration and
application of the respective trade laws. For example, the domestic adminis-
tering agencies, knowing that their decisions could be subject to binational
panel review, would be forced to be more objective in their decision-making
process on trade law actions. Also, the review of domestic trade law
implementation and application by the binational panels instead of the
domestic court systems would increase the predictability, consistency, and
neutrality because 1) the panels would conduct their review under common
and mutually agreed to procedures that are both adequate and fair, 2) the
panels' decisions would allow convergence of both nation's legal precedents
and trade law remedies, eliminating the disparity among the respective
domestic judges on the interpretation and application the trade laws, and 3)
the binational composition of the panels of trade experts from both nations,
along with the extraordinary challenge procedures, would help to eliminate
perceptions of bias and political interference in each nations' domestic
decision-making and judicial appeal processes.
Third, use of the dispute resolution procedures under the NAFTA would
be a more expeditious method for the settlement of disputes than what is
currently available in the domestic legal systems of either nation or under the
GAT7. A dispute brought under the NAFTA procedures would have to be
resolved within 315 days. However, in both domestic judicial systems and
in the GATT, the review and appeal process can drag on for years.
Fourth, since the dispute resolution procedures would be initiated and
conducted under the auspices of the respective governments of the Parties,
in 61 cases. However, with the increasing use of these trade laws by domestic industries and
the additional complications posed by the administrative investigations, Mexico has either
amended or is considering amending these trade laws to better cope with the sophistication and
complexities of international trade. Some of these amendments include: (1) more adequate time
frames between procedural stages, (2) better notification and service of process methods, (3)
more intense verifications proceedings, (4) more expeditious reviews, and (5) more involvement
of Mexican government officers and commercial attaches abroad. Sandoval, supra note 174.
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the costly financial burden of challenging the interpretation and application
of domestic trade laws, which under the judicial system or the GATT would
have been paid for by the firms bringing the challenge, would be shifted to
the respective federal governments. This would allow smaller importers,
producers, and/or other interested parties access to the dispute resolution
process under the NAFTA which would not have access to the domestic
judicial systems or the GATT because of the expense.
Lastly, the use of the dispute resolution procedures from the Canada-
U.S. FTA in the NAFTA would improve the ability of the respective Parties
to enforce the rights and obligations of the NAFTA. Both Parties would be
aware going into the NAFTA that the decisions of the binational arbitration
panels are binding. Penalties for non-compliance would be a certainty. But
the specific sanction imposed, be it removal, modification or non-implement-
ation of the offending measure, suspension of equivalent benefits (retaliation),
or compensation, is flexible, allowing the method of enforcement to focus on
the issue of the dispute. This possibility of direct and prompt sanctions
would encourage mutual resolution and avoidance of disputes.
E. Recommendations For Tailoring The Canada-U.S. FTA
Dispute Resolution Procedures For the NAFTA
While the dispute resolution procedures from the Canada-U.S. FTA
would improve the dispute resolution process under the NAFTA, there are
several areas in which these procedures could be tailored to address and
mitigate specific concerns that uniquely affect the trade relations of the
United States and Mexico.
One of the U.S. complaints regarding Mexico's administration of its
trade laws, is that often U.S. firms are not notified that they are the subject
of an antidumping or countervailing duty action in Mexico until after the
domestic proceeding is completed. This precludes the U.S. firm from
participating in and protecting its interests in the domestic proceeding. This
occurs because, unlike the United States which notifies interested parties of
impending domestic action by administrating agencies through the Federal
Register, Mexico does not have an effective domestic notification procedure.
Mexico does have an equivalent publication to the Federal Register entitled
Diario Official, but this publication is difficult to get in the United States.
Therefore, for all intents and purposes, no notice is available. One way this
situation could be remedied would be to require both governments to notify
the other of impending domestic action affecting any rights and obligations
under the NAFTA through the trilateral Trade Commission. This would
provide each government with the responsibility to notify their own interested
parties of actions being taken in the other nation that would affect them.
Another area in which the dispute resolution procedures could be
modified would be to extend the availability of the extraordinary challenge
procedures to the binational panel of experts used under the Chapter Eighteen
procedures. Currently, the extraordinary challenge procedures can only be
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invoked when one Party alleges misconduct by a member of a binational
arbitration panel convened under Chapter Nineteen procedures. The
extension the use of these extraordinary challenge procedures to binational
panels of experts under Chapter Eighteen could aid in alleviating national
sovereignty and political interference concerns in the dispute resolution
process.
The existing dispute resolution procedures could also be modified to
allow disputes involving a "separate agreement"' 81 concerning, for exam-
ple, labor standards, or environmental protection, that might be appended to
(but not part of) the NAFTA. If this separate agreement materializes, the use
of the dispute resolution procedures from Chapter Eighteen, making use of
the trilateral Trade Commission and the binational dispute settlement panels,
would be effective in managing, and policing the rights and obligations
created therein by alleviating national sovereignty and political interference
concerns.
A final recommendation involves the implementation of a training
program to familiarize U.S., Canadian and Mexican panelists with the
respective legal systems of each others countries and, Mexican panelists, with
international trade dispute settlement; Mexico having only acceded to GATT
five years ago. Mexico, Canada and the United States have fundamentally
different legal systems. The United States and Canadian legal systems are
built upon common law, stare decisis, principles, a process by which law is
created by judges through case decisions. In contrast, the Mexican legal
system is based on codes which set forth broad principles of law which are
applied to specific instances through the use of deductive reasoning.182
While the systems, particularly in trade law areas, appear to be evolving,
making them more and more comparable; there is still is concern among
trade experts that panelists would feel incompetent to construe and apply the
other's laws. There is an appalling lack knowledge, particularly on the U.S.
side, of Mexican law." Therefore, before panelists can effectively apply
each other's antidumping and countervailing duty laws under Chapter
Nineteen dispute resolution procedures, they must understand the fundamen-
tal principles behind these different systems and how the respective laws
work. With the establishment of a training program, the panelists can gain
the knowledge, confidence and experience necessary to successfully carry out
181. "As a result of congressional opposition to a free trade agreement with Mexico, the Bush
administration is discussing with Mexican officials the possibility of negotiating a separate
agreement covering worker's wages, rights and safety as well as environmental controls."
Shore, supra note 157.
182. Hope H. Camp, Jr., Binding Arbitration: A Preferred Alternative for Resolving
Commercial Disputes Between Mexican and U.S. Businessmen, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 717, 720
(1991).
183. Remarks of Michale H. Stein, Panel Concerning Applicability of the Dispute Settlement
Procedures to a North American Free Trade Agreement, at 2-5, FORUM on Binational Dispute
Resolution Procedures Under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, held by the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States (Apr. 23, 1991).
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their responsibilities under the Chapter Nineteen dispute resolution proce-
dures.
CONCLUSION
The inclusion of dispute resolution procedures, as tailored, from the
existing Canada-U.S. FTA into the NAFTA would address and mitigate the
political, cultural and legal differences affecting the United States and Mexico
in their trade relations. These procedures would be specifically designed to
verify and secure the rights and obligations of a FTA. The creation of a
trilateral Trade Commission and the use of a dispute settlement panel of
experts would encourage initial notification and consultation on trade
problems, preempt the development of trade disputes and expedite the
resolution of disputes that do occur between the United States and Mexico on
an equal basis. In particular, the provisions for binding dispute settlement
arbitration panels in antidumping and countervailing duty disputes would
promote predictability, consistency, objectivity, and neutrality in the
application of trade laws, removing a major source of discord in trade
relations.
Under a free trade agreement that includes efficient and effective dispute
resolution procedures, the United States and Mexico could internationally
recognize and cement their interdependent trade relations. No longer would
Mexico and the United States be distant neighbors, but they would become
equal partners in a regional trading bloc formulated for the mutual benefit of
both parties.
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